SETTING THE STAGE

In February of 1865, Union General Sherman and his Federal force of 60,000 men were moving from Columbia, South Carolina, north towards Charlotte, North Carolina, where Confederate General Joseph E. Johnston had assumed command of the Army of Tennessee.  The only organized Confederate forces in the area were Lieutenant General William J. Hardee’s Infantry Corps of 8,000 and Lieutenant General Joseph Wheeler and Major General Matthew C. Butler’s Cavalry that were combined on March 8th under Lieutenant General Wade Hampton and totaled approximately 5,800.

Gen. Sherman chose to swing east towards Fayetteville to allow resupply from Wilmington, destroy the arsenal (now the site of the Museum of the Cape Fear), threaten Raleigh and eventually link up with other Federal forces from the coast in Goldsboro.  Gen. Sherman delayed indicating his intentions in the hope of trapping the Confederate forces on the west side of the Cape Fear River by beating them into Fayetteville and seizing the bridge.  Major General Kilpatrick operated well forward and to the left of the main Federal force as if scouting the route to Charlotte, with the intention of turning east at the last possible moment.

Gen. Johnston hoped to use his cavalry to isolate a wing of Sherman’s army and destroy it causing a delay in Sherman’s movement, and allowing him to consolidate the Confederate forces.  Thus, Lt. Gen. Wheeler and Maj. Gen.Butler were under order to attack the wing of Sherman’s army should the opportunity present itself.

APPROACHING THE CAMP: MARCH 9, 1865

Hampered by rain and harassed by Confederate Patrols, Kilpatrick’s Division was strung out and scattered, but moving east along Morganton Road.  The 1st Brigade, furthest back, had been instructed to proceed down Chicken Road in the hopes of blocking the Confederate Cavalry.  Kilpatrick’s scouts entered the camp at Monroe’s Crossroads in the morning and camped south of Nicholson Creek to await the rest of the Division.  The 3rd and 4th Brigades as well as a section of artillery from the 10th Wisconsin Light Battery arrived next around 2100.  Kilpatrick, his staff and a detail from the 3rd Brigade had stayed behind to direct the 2nd Brigade to follow along Morganton Road after it had closed up.  Kilpatrick and his escort were also approaching the camp.

Butler’s advance guard arrived at the intersection of Yadkin and Morganton Roads.  They noted that at least a mounted brigade had passed the spot very recently.  As they discussed the situation, Kilpatrick’s advance guard also arrived at the intersection and was promptly captured.  Kilpatrick and his escorts, following a short distance behind, narrowly made their escape through the woods to the south, skirting the Confederate units and reentering Morganton Road to the east where they proceeded on to the camp.  The Union scouts had not detected the Confederate Cavalry thus leading Kilpatrick to believe that the incident at the intersection and the sporadic gunfire to the west was the result of a chance encounter with a Confederate patrol.  Brevet Brigadier General Atkins and the 2nd Brigade, also moving east toward camp behind Kilpatrick came upon the rear of Butler’s Division.  They were undetected by the Confederates.  Realizing the road ahead was blocked, they countermarched in order to find a way around.  Soon the brigade was mired down in the swamp of Piney Bottom Creek.   To the south, three divisions of Sherman’s infantry entered Plank Road, and were also moving east.

PROPOSED ATTACK POSITION

Throughout the rainy night the Confederates scouted the Federal camp determining the exact location of each unit and their commands.  Kilpatrick and his female companion, along with her mother and several other officers were quartered in the Monroe house (currently unoccupied).  The Union officers were tired, wet, and confident that the war would soon end in their favor.  They were not as diligent in their defense of the camp as they should have been.  Guards had been set out in the direction of Fayetteville, but few to the west and none to the north where the Confederates were now approaching.  Confederate Captain Shannon and his scouts succeeded in capturing the only guards to the west without a shot, leaving the entire north and west sides of the camp open to Confederate reconnaissance.  The Confederate scouts were able to go right into the Union camp and lead horses away without being detected. 

Hampton proposed a dawn attack led by Butler’s Division from the north, Wheeler’s Corps from the northwest and Hume’s Division from the west across a small tributary of Nicholson Creek.  Hampton further gave control of the battle to Wheeler to carry out as planned leaving himself and Brig. Gen. Dibrell in reserve. 

To the east the Union 2nd Brigade had extracted themselves from the swamp and were moving again down Morganton Road.  The Union 1st Brigade, farthest back, was just departing Bethesda Church moving toward Chicken Road.

“CAVALRY IN THE CAMP!”

Wheeler gave the command:  “The Walk!” and the command moved out spurred on by the bugler.  Wheeler shouted  “The Trot!” and after a few short minutes “The Gallop!”.  The full momentum of hundreds of gray horsemen in columns of regiments was now bearing down on the awakening Federals.  They swept past the house and into the camp, firing pistols and slashing with sabers.  The Confederate POWs were the first to realize an attack was underway and began to make their escape towards the attacking Confederates.  Before they could be identified some were shot by their comrades.  Many attacking Confederates were confused thinking the first line had been repulsed.  The attack so surprised the Federals that they could do little more than flee south where the swamps of Nicholson Creek stopped their retreat.  The Confederates completely overran the camp stopping only when the Federals seemed to be completely run off.  The prospect of much loot in the camp became their primary concern.  Turning back into the camp they encountered still more fleeing Federals.  Confusion reigned and hand to hand combat was common.

“WHERE IS GENERAL KILPATRICK?”

During the night planning of the battle at least three Confederate officers developed plans for the capture of Kilpatrick.  During the melee of the battle however, only Confederate Captain Bostick had the chance to carry out his orders.  Kilpatrick had come out to the porch just before the attack, but was not yet in uniform.  Captain Bostick rode up with the first wave of the attack and, not recognizing Kilpatrick, demanded “Where is General Kilpatrick?”.  Kilpatrick, realizing his luck replied “There he goes on that horse!” and Bostick and his escort quickly rode off after an unfortunate officer who was making his escape down Blue’s Road.  Kilpatrick ran for the cover of the woods and swamp to the south of camp, joining up with most of his units there.

CONFEDERATE RIGHT BOGS DOWN

Confederate Brig. Gen. Humes to the west had also attacked at the sound of the bugle, but was immediately repulsed by dense thicket and heavy fire from the Federal 1st Alabama Cavalry.  This unit was in the southern portion of the camp, and had not received the brunt of the initial attack.  Hume’s division, in their night maneuver to attack position had positioned themselves west of not one, but two of the tributaries to Nicholson Creek.  He was now aware that they were attempting to attack across an impenetrable swamp.  Humes ordered his attack to pull back and move north to find an easier crossing.

FEDERAL COUNTERATTACK

The Federal soldiers now floundering neck deep in the swamps south of camp broke off their flight and, encouraged by the arrival of Kilpatrick and other soldiers made their way back to the edge of the camp.  As the Federal veterans began to organize their line and prepare the weapons they had instinctively grabbed in flight they were joined by Kilpatrick’s Scouts, who had camped south of Nicholson Creek and were now just arriving after hearing the gunfire.

CONFEDERATES SCRAMBLE FOR SUPPLIES

In camp, order was impossible to maintain as hundreds of hungry and ill-clothed Confederates intermingled in the confined area of the camp in a desperate attempt to collect food and supplies.  Wheeler ordered some of his men to begin pulling away the guns, but this endeavor was stopped short as the rapid firing Spencer carbines of the reorganized Federal lines to the south began to take their toll on the Confederates in the camp.  Unable to reorganize the scattered Confederate units in the camp, Wheeler sent for Dibrell to bring the reserve forward.  As the Federals continued their advancing fire into the camp couriers soon returned to Wheeler with the news that Hampton had already brought the reserves onto the field, and they too were now scattered and useless to the Confederate commanders.

STETSON REACHES THE GUNS

In the confusion, First Lieutenant Ebenezer Stetson, commanding the Federal artillery section, managed to reach his 3 inch Hotchiss gun and fire.  Inspired, the Federals surged forward and other gunners joined him.  The Confederates reacted quickly, cutting down the exposed gunners and gathering together for a counterattack.  Led by Wheeler, elements of Allen’s Division again charged into the camp only to meet a withering fire from the Federal carbines.  The charge was broken off, reformed and another attempt was made only to be repulsed even more decisively than the first.  Upon seeing Wheeler’s charges repulsed, Butler attempted his own with elements of Young’s Brigade but was met by a barrage of canister fire.  Wheeler and Hampton quickly conferred and decided that in view of the probability that Federal Infantry would soon be on the scene withdrawal would be prudent.  Exhaustion, lack of ammunition and no encouragement from their commanders prevented a Union pursuit.

AFTERMATH

Kilpatrick and his men hurriedly buried the dead and moved out traveling south on Blues Rosin Road to Plank Road and then east toward Fayetteville.

The Confederate Cavalry moved slowly into Fayetteville and established camp at the arsenal, allowing the wounded to be treated at local hospitals and homes.  On the morning of March 11, with Sherman’s army closing in, the Confederates evacuated Fayetteville and crossed the Cape Fear leaving a few Cavalry to burn the bridge as the Federals approached.

The Battle of Monroe’s Crossroads was over by 0900 on the morning of March 10, leaving perhaps 200 dead and a larger number of wounded and prisoners.  Official reports and accounts written long after the war vary greatly in the numbers of casualties and captures.

References: National Park Service; North Carolina Office of Archives and History; Eric J. Wittenburg, Battle of Monroe’s Crossroads and the Civil War’s Final Campaign (2006); William Preston Mangum II, “Kill Cavalry’s Nasty Surprise,” America’s Civil War (November 1996); John G. Barrett, The Civil War in North Carolina (1963).